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ABSTRAC T
The primary probl e m of t his s t udy is t o clarif y
Sar tr e 's conce pt of praxis a s a pr oje c t ive action of human
co ns c ious nes s which crea t e s his t or y a nd makes it int el l igible .
I

f oc us on Sartre 's a t t e mpt t o combine a n e xis t ential

humanis m with a the or y of his t ory as a progr e s s ive move ment
genera t e d by individual a c t ors , their s ocial groups , a nd
their environm e ntal s urr oundings .

Sartr e 's Critiq ue

provide s t he phil os ophical bas is f or und e rs ta nding s ocial
inst itutions a nd beha vior , a nd des cribes huma n act ion as
a c ompl e x t otal ity c ompr is ing fre e s ubje c t ivit y and it s
unavoidabl e e nvironm e nt .
This inquir y f oc us e s on t he e xis t e nt ial roo t of
Sartre 's t heory of his t or y a nd t he probl e ma t ic na ture of
his po s ition.

Al t hough he all oca t e s priority to an act or's

co ns c iousnes s and a c t ions , his e xplanat ion, at time s , is
vague a nd unc onvincing.

W hil e he e mphas izes human f reedom

he ina dvertl y illustrat e s t he e normous influe nce of a
material world which is bey ond our contr ol .
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INTRO DUCTIO N
Jean-Paul Sart re , in his later works , tries t o
synthes ize his e xistentialis t view of human freedom with
a the ory of his tory.

Believing Marxis m to be a humanis t

phil os op hy , he interprets Marxis t s ocial the ory in te rms
of e xis te ntial ism .

1

The Marxis t theory favored by Sartre

is that o f the young , Hegel ia n Marx , who ins is ted that man
make s his tory , and is conditioned by his e xternal environment.
Sartre hop e s t o prove that his t ory is e xis t e ntially intell i
gibl e .

A l though ma n is affe ct ed by his circums tances , he ,

not matte r , is the propell ing force of his tory.

The

following the s is is a s t udy of human praxis a nd its
relations hip to our comprehe nd ing and creating his tory .
In reply to accusations that exis t e ntial is m is a
phil os op hy of anxiety , Sartre counte rs in " Exis te ntialis m
is a Humanis m , " originall y delivered in Paris in 194 5 , tha t
exis te ntial ism i s the thought of human s ubje ctivity .
"Exis te ntialis m's firs t move is t o make e ve ry man aware of
what he is and to make the
2
exis te nce res t on him."

full

resp onsibil ity of his

Subjectivity means that "an

1

sartre manifests this inte ntion espe cially in the
Search f or a Me thod , trans . Hazel Barns , New York , Vantage
Books ed. 1968 . He reafter this book is ref erred to as SFM
and future page refe rences will appear in parenthe ses in the
main body of the text.
2
Jean-Paul Sartre , "Exis t e ntial is m is a Humanism" in
Exis tential ism ve rs us Marxis m , ed . Ge orge Novack , New York ,
Dell Publ is hing C o. , Inc. , D el ta Books ed. 1966 , p. 7 4
1

2
individua l chooses and makes himself."

J

Sartre ins ists that

"it is imp os s ible for man t o trans cend human s ubjectivity."
Man is abs olutely f ree .

4

He chooses not only hims elf but

als o for all his fellow men bas ed on his own need.

As t he

creator of his tory , through his own activity he choos es his
world.

This is his s ubjectivity.

Opp os ing both total rea s on (spirit) a nd t otal mat eria l
is m , Sartre takes the middle ground.

Marx had disagreed

with H egel's view that t he dialectic of hist ory was
primarily spiritual.
of matter.

His dialectic was rather a function

For Sartre the dialectical f orce of matter is

defined by man's cons cious ness of it .

Matter its elf cannot

comp rehend the dia lectic a nd if the s ubject of the dialectic
cannot comprehend this , there is , f or Sartre , no dia lectic
at a ll.

H owever , wit hout matter man has no ground for

dialectical act ion.

The dialectic is the movement its elf

as well as the method of comprehens ion of that movement.
The s ubject himself is not onl y a creator of the movement
but als o an agent of the comprehens ion of the movement as
a whole.

Sartre's his torica l materialis m a s s erts that matter

lies in a dialectica l proces s only through human intervention
in his tory.

I n this s ens e the matter is the external

condition of man's own dia lect ic.

Beca us e man cannot develop

his exis tence in his t ory without the media tion of matter ,
matter a ls o s hares the s ubjective rule of dia lectical
proces s .

Nevertheles s , for Sa rtre , the effects of the

J
mediation depend only on man's understanding of that
mediation.
As a humanis t , Sartre remarks that man is the maker of
his own his t ory and a fre e agent in making his tory inte lligible.

As a s oc ial s c ientis t he de c lares t ha t man inte grates

his c ircums tances t o create his tory in relation t o other
men and matter.

In his Critiq ue of D iale c tica l Reason ,

Sartre tries t o c ombine the s e p ositions with a the ory of the
inte lligibility of his t ory.

He s e e ks t o harmoniz e his

humanis t ontology with s c ientific hist orical s oc ial theory.
Sartre attempts t o make the inte lligibility of human
hist ory more c oncre te by dealing with s e veral que s tions.
What , he asks , is his t ory in a humanis t and pra c tical s ens e ?
Under what c ondit ions can it b e c omprehended?
means can it be understood?

And by what

The tas k of his Critique is

t o s how "the fundamental identity be twe en individual life
and human hist ory

•

•

•

the identity of the s e two totalis ing

5
proc e s s e s mus t its e lf be proved.
The Critiq ue is a s t udy of the relat ionship of man to
the s urrounding world.

I t is a study of how a free individua l

makes his exis tence meaningful without los ing his ontological
freedom.

Man is c ons trained by his lifetime relations hip

with his environment , unles s he is tota lly is olated like

5

Jean-Paul Sar tre, Critique of Diale ctica l Reas on ,
trans . Alan Sheridan-Smith, ed. Johathan R�e , London , N LB ,
197 6 . Hereafter this book is refereed t o a s CRD , and future
page references will appear in parenthes e s in the main
body of the text.

4
Robis on Crus oe .

D e s pite the se cons traints , however, Sartrre

be lieves that an individual integrates his circums tance s ,
including the relationship with ot her men, int o his own
exis te nce.

This integration is by the individual's

dialectical interaction with his s urrounding .
serves t o conne ct him internally with obje cts .

This me thod
The

s ynthe s ize d meaning of his t ory is pos s ible by the tota lizing
act ivity of man's own activity in the conte xt of s urrounding
conditions .

Ins ofar as an individual realizes this internal

bond within s ocial relations hips he finds hims e lf a part
of the proces s of his t ory and a s ubjective age nt of the
comprehe ns ion of that his t ory.
I will now examine the nat ure of diale ctical reason,
pra xis as human labor in s ocial relations , the internal
and e xterna l relationship be tween man a nd his environment,
constituted praxis of a group as s ocial a ct ivity t oward
hist ory, and the diale ctical intelligibility of his t ory .
Sartre pres ents dialectical rea s on as the me thod of
comprehending his tory.

No affairs of s tate in this world

can be e xplained as merel y causal relations hips be twe e n
eve nts occuring in seque nce .

For the pre s e nt is its e l f the

total of what has be e n and wha t s hall be .

Man is a

participant in the dialectical proce s s and as s uch can
comprehe nd it only from within.
obje ctive obs ervation.

There can be no detache d

This is the s ubject of chapter I.

The Critique is the study of what ma n ' s role is in
his tory and how this role is deve loped in relation to

5
material conditions a nd with other man.

The concept of

praxis is the fundame ntal the s is of Sar tre ' s s ocial theory.
Praxis is huma n labor in the world to satisfy perce ive d
ne eds.

Man realizes the s carcity of wha t he wants , deve lops

a proj e ct to achieve it , and interiorizes the external
.
conditions along with the project.

Praxis is , as Sartre

defines it in the Search f or a Method , not mere a ction , but
purpos eful human activity directed by the project.

This

is carefully e xamined in chapter II.
A ccording to Sartre's theory of his tory this s carcity
is the s tarting point of human interaction.

There is not

e nough of anything in the world to meet the nee ds of
everyone .
others .

Each pers on wants obje cts that are de s ired by

The nee d for the s carce obj ect is the origin of

human activity.

Complete satisfaction is imposs ible .

Whe n

the firs t ne e d is satisfie d , new nee ds appear in a n e ndle s s
s ucces s ion.

This is the beginning of interaction be tween

men, a nd be twee n man a nd his world.

Totalization is the

m ovement towards a human proj e ct that f ulfills the nee ds of
this s carcity.

The individual re cognizes him s e lf through

his cons ciousnes s of things and other people which aris e s
from his s truggle t o a lle viate his perce ption of s carcity.
The important concept of totalization is examined in
chapter III.
The effect of s carcity on human relations and the
efforts to overcome it are therefore the bas is of human
socialization.

Man is alie nated by material conditions and

6
by people, and everyone is deemed a threat to life.
this state there is no humanity.

In

The serial individual

escapes from his seriality through cooperation within the
group.

A group

is formed from the desire to regain human

freedom through a common effort to overcome individual
alienation.

Men sharing the same project create a common

praxis to accomplish their individual projects.

Insofar

as each individual separates his life from everyone else's,
there is no shared project.

Group activity, for Sartre,

is both the beginning of humanity and the motive force of
history.

Group praxis is the subject of the fourth chapter.

The action and reaction between agents of totalization,
within groups in society, is the driving force of history.
Toward the end of the Critique, Sartre sees contemporary
capitalist society as isolating man from humanity.

Sartre

challenges material determinism and Marxist revolutionary
solutions by the victory of one class against another.
For Sartre not only the working class but also the bourgeoi
sie are the agents of history's dialectical process.

The

struggle itself, not the victory of the proletariat in the
struggle, is the motive force of history.

Sartre concludes

that there is no completion of totalization because the
process itself is dialectical, continuously connecting
past and future.

Only through this constant struggle is

man able to comprehend history.

The intelligibility of

history is examined in chapter V.
This study focuses on Sartre's conceptualization of

7
praxis as the subject of the dialectical progression of
history, and its role within that dialectic.

Though Sartre

provides a humanistic basis to view history, weaknesses of
his theory of history are also caused by the persistent
claim of the absolute freedom of the subject within all
interaction with his environment.

This study is to

ascertain how Sartre determines that continuous movement of
history which is based on human activity and to discover
whether or not his proposed intelligibility is reasonable.

CHAPTER I
DIALECTICAL REASON AND ITS INTELLIGIBILITY
For Sartre, dialectical materialism is the only way
If the historical movement is

to explain human history.

not dialectical and if the development is not understood
by dialectical reasoning, there is no history at all.

To

prove that a dialectic exists, "it must be proved that a
negation of a negation can be an affirmation, that
conflicts--within a person or a group--are the motive force
of History, that each moment of a series is comprehensible
on the basis of the initial moment, though irreducible
to it,

( and ) that History continually effects totalisations

of totalisations

•

•

•

•

"

( CRD 1 5 )

This is the task of

Sartre's social theory in the Critique.
Among the many theorists of the dialectic, Sartre has
been influenced most by Hegel.

The basis of Hegel's

dialectic is his assertion that every action of nature and
man developes systematically.

All interaction begins

within a given situation under already established conditions,
conditions which conflict with efforts to change them to
more desirable ones.

The combination of change and

resistance forms a new unity.

The two previous stages are

absorbed into a third and new condition, which does not
end the process but merely becomes the first stage of
8

9
yet another dialectic.

This is not an unchanging cycle.

Rather, "it is a development in quantity punctuated now
and then by a qualitative change, a "leap" from one quality
level to a higher quality level.

This dialectical
6
"
Although
·
t1on:
movement has no po1nt of cu1 m1na
·

·

•

•

•

•

the apparent form of movement is as cyclical as Hegel's
concept of "thesis, " "anti-thesis" and "synthesis, " every
dialectic varies in content as it varies in time.

In

Sartre's words the "transition from one state to another
?
is always a process of enrichment. "
Although Hegel serves as the major influence for
Sartre, it is necessary to contrast the Hegelian dialectic
with that of Marx for one to fully understand Sartre's
position.
For Hegel history is the process of self-development
of the World Spirit.

8

The driving power of the dialectic

is Spirit, which is defined as divine Providence.

9

There

are two realms of this dialectic, one of nature and one of
Spirit.

Nature is also a rational system but the realm

6

walter Odajnyk, Marxism and Existentialism, New York
Doubleday & Company, Inc. , Anchor Books ed. 1965, p. 6.
7

Jean-Paul Sartre, "Marxism and Revolution", in
Existentialism versus Marxism, ed. George Novack, New York,
Dell Publishing Co. Inc. , 1966, p. 98.
8
Georg l.t'l. F. Hegel, Reason in History, trans. Revert s.
Hartman, New Yor, N Y, The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. , 1954.
As an introduction of the Philosophy of History, Hegel shows
here the concept of Reason as a solution to the dialectic
of the universal and the particular.
9

Ibid., p. 14.

10
of the dialectic of nature cannot be thought independently
of its relationship to Spirit.

Without the interrelation

ship there is no dialectical progress in nature.

Spirit

is not mere human consciousness although it is brought
about in man, but a superior power which unfolds dialectic,
world history.

Spirit is the dynamic of history, as a

totality of men and nature and their interaction.

Therefore

the point of historical synthesis is that of actualization
of the Spirit through its materialized form, which
Hegel believes to be the nation state.

Only at the point

of actualization, only when Spirit appears by itself in
a materialized form can man experience absolute freedom.
In other words, for Hegel, history is a predetermined
process initiated by one absolute force.

Neither man nor

material world (nature) can go toward their conscious
end, but they are only directed to the goal of the World
Spirit as the absolute good.
Marx explains history as a dialectic.

Even though

he accepts the logic of the dialectic, he cannot agree
with the explanation that every action is spiritually
governed.

For Marx the dynamic of history is action,

man's labor.

Man is what he does.

The action is character

ized by working on matter to produce useful things to
meet human needs.

This action is then influenced by its

fruits, its products.

According to I/larxist materialism,

man is a part of nature.

Everything including law, social

classes and man's brain is reduced to rnatter.

r.1an's

11
consciousness is the product of matter.

It is merely the

product of the environment to which he belongs.

History

is understood as a process in which man acts on nature to
transform it to meet his needs, and nature in turn influences
man.

Man's consciousness is entirely dependent on his
Outside of his class he has no individual

social position.
perspective.

The materialist view further differs from

Hegelian idealism in that the relationship between man
and matter is characterized by the material determinism of
man's praxis.

Man does not make nature a part of the

dialectic through his interaction with it.

Rather nature

determines man's existence.
Sartre contends that reason is neither idealistic nor
materialistic.

He is convinced that the Hegelian view of

the comprehensibility of the dialectic through Spirit is
not the way to prove the intelligibility of the dialectical
development of history.

There is no absolute power to

Believing in no absolute power such as

create history.

God, Sartre argues that man creates the world by himself.
Sartre also believes that the driving power of history is
man's action, praxis.
development ends.

There is no final point at which

As long as man's consciousness and action

go on toward an unknown future, the dialectic will continue.
In challenging the idealistic view of reason, Sartre criti
cizes Hegel for ignoring the role of matter within human
consciousness.

Hegel asserts that matter is the necessary

condition of man's consciousness which is a humanized form

12
of the Spirit.

But for Sartre the investigation of the

dialectic is possible only by comprehending the interaction
between man's action and external things, so that Hegel
fails to see matter as outside of mind.

Sartre further

rejects the materialistic tendency to reduce everything,
including man's consciousness, to matter.

For matter, by

itself, does not generate dialectical reasoning.

If matter

alone evolves dialectically, Sartre insists, only analytical
reason--not dialectical reason--can explain all interrelation
ships causally.
The dialectic is the form of interaction between men,
man and matter, individual men and groups, and between
groups within a set of social relationships.

Sartre

criticizes the analytical method of understanding a relation
ships.

Sartre criticizes the analytical method of under

standing a relationship, such as that used in natural
science, and compares it with the dialectical comprehension
of such relationships.

In analytical reasoning there is

the presupposition that every relationship lies in "a
definite system of a priori principles and laws. " ( CRD 19)
This he refutes by contending that every movement or
phenomena is understood only by human experience in
tical relationship with matter.

dialec

"It is action asserting

itself within the undertaking, in the explanation of the
field and the unification of the means by the end. "
In his article, "Materialism and Revolution. " Sartre
compares these two ways of thinking and stresses the

( CRD 20)

13
necessity of dialectical reasoning in comprehending t he
world and human history.
Sartre believes that materialism, as conceived by
contemporary Marxists, served to reduce the action of mind
to that of mat ter.

But for the dialectical materialist

human subjectivity, as action of the mind, is found in
every worldly interaction.

Sartre challenges the material

ist's view that only material things are rational.

This

perspective rejects as unreal all that is not visible or
empirically discernible.

In rejecting this view Sartre

refers to Hegel.
Hegel, on the other hand, states that every rational
thing is so by human reason.

The comprehension of t he

10
whole is not causal, but is "synthetic and multidimensional. "
The determination that something is rational or real is
made by man's mind.

Every form of matter is t he result

of man's previous attempt s to understand or to be conscious
of it.

A rational system cannot be separated from man's

dialectical relationship to it.

This dialectical reason

is the way man can see and understand what is true.
Sartre explains this with examples.

When one sees a

desk, for instance, that desk is not a thing with four legs,
three drawers and so on, but is the result of the particular
arrangement of its parts.
ances.

10

The parts are "isolat ed appear

lJIJhen they occur together, it is always within the

sartre, r/1arxism and Revolution, p. 91.

14
high unity of a whole, and they are bound together by
inner relationships, that is, the presence of one modifies
11
the other in its inner nature. "

In analytical reasoning

things are understood causally, a unit is only what it
appears to be.

It possesses quantitative characteristics

within a scientific universe.

In perceiving an object a

materialist using analytical reason notes different elements
which unite to form one object.

For example, the chemical

making of water is a combination of hydrogen and oxygen.
Yet, even in combination, "the elements' retain their
12
individual identity. "

But for Sartre, using Hegelian

dialectical interpretation, water is the totality which
results from the set of elements and their combination.
It is irreducible into its original state of independent
oxygen and hydrogen.

The objective of science is to analyze

the various elements which are combined to form an object
It cannot prove

and to thereby learn more about the object.
the qualitative transformation of the object.

Only dialec

tical reasoning can comprehend the quality and the internal
unity of things.

Though a dialectician, Sartre condemns

the idea of a dialectic of nature.

To him, nature cannot

develop its relationship to man by itself.
animated only from without.

111atter is

For there to be a dialectic

its subject must not only be part of the dialectical
movement but also the agent of comprehension of that
12
Ibid. , p. 92.

15
dialectic.

If there is a dialectic in nature, it must

be that nature is able to participate in the dialectical
movement and conceive the movement by itself.
what Sartre disagrees with.

This is

Even though there is dialectical

movement in nature, only human consciousness can see and
know that its totality (matter or nature) is the synthesis
from the past and the beginning of another synthesis.
Dialectical thinking is intelligible through totalization.
A totality is not a process, but merely the result of
past activity which is an internally related whole.

Total-

ization, however, is action in process though it is also
internally related.

Totalization is the action of human

consciousness to transform the external world into the
internal world, to posit the external into one's project.
It is action which occurs anywhere and at any time, both
individually and universally.

Norman McLeod defines

totalization in "Existential Freedom in the Marxism of J.
P. Sartre" as

"a method of integrating existentially

free human activity into dialectical pattern. "

1.3

To understand human action and history in terms of
totalization and to understand totalization in its various
forms one must first understand the concept of te��oralization as discussed in Being and Nothingness.

For the temporal

totalities of human activity constitute the action of

1.3
Norman McLeod, "Existential Freedom in the Marxism
of Jean-Paul Sartre", Dialogue, 7, 1968-69, p .3.3·
•

16
endless movement toward new object.

Sartre states that for

an action , "to totalise itself means to temporalise itself. "
(CRD 5 3)

The three aspects of time , past, present , and
14
future , are "like a point without dimension. "
The past
is the past in the present.

The past exists and remains

as a transcendent past and , at the same time , a predictable
future.

The present , thus , should be known as the synthesis

of the past and the future.
sequential.

These aspects of time are not

Time exists in man ' s consciousness as the

internal relationship between past , present and future.
Thus , temporalization is the dialectical activity of human
consciousness , and existence is itself constant temporalization.

Temporalization is "a constant self-transcendence

from what I am no-longer to what I am not-yet , which makes
15
time itself a structure of my being. "

In Search for a

r.1ethod Sartre makes it plain that "dialectic as a movement
of reality collapses if time is not dialectic. " ( sp;vr 92)
Time is not given to man but , conversely , man defines time
through temporalization.

"One must understand that neither

men nor their activities are in time , but that time , as
14

Jean-Paul �artre , Heing and Nothingness, trans.
Hazel E. Barnes , I\iew York , L'iashington Square P ress , 1966
Hereafter this book is referred to as BI'·I and
p. 159.
future page references will appear in parentheses in the
main body of the text.
15

Yirmiahu Yovel , "Existentialism and Historical
Dialectic , " P hilosophy and P henomenological Research , 39 ,
1979 p . 482 .
'
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concrete quality of history, is made by men on the basis
of their original temporalization." (Ibid. )
Sartre insists that the internal connection of
temporality by human consciousness " has its being outside
of it, before and behind.

Behind, it was its past, and

before, it will be its future

•

•

•

•

A t p resent it is not

what it is (past) and it is what it is not (future) ." (BN 179)
Human consciousness is the " flight" toward that which is not
yet.

T emporalization is the expression of the action of

totalization in accordance with the nature of time.

T otality

is temporal in the sense that it is endlessly absorbed
within a still newer totality.

T he endless movement

searching for an unknown future is itself totalization.
For Sartre the temporal totality is merely a moment of
practical totalization.
Human acts of totalization never end, and are recip rocal
with one another.

Men totalize their environment in

accordance with their desires for existence.
totalizations meet one another in daily life.

T heir various
One encounters

another p erson or another person's activity as an object or
circumstance of one's own.

Both parties intermingle as

parts or objects of each other's totalizing activity.

In

human consciousness of the future the totality is not an
eternal entity , but is always the starting point of
totalization in process.

:::1an produces an object , for

example , which is then used to totalize the environment of
another.

Both parties encounter one another through

18
totalized obj ects.

T heir action is mediated by the obj ect

and a reciprocal relationship is formed.

In life man

seeks the final achieve ment of some desirable state.
However, there are only momentary or partial totalities
O ne

which are inevitably detotalized and formed yet again.
is merely part of the totalization of others or a still

small er element within the larger totality that is human
history.

T his is a never-ending , ongoing process .

Man exists within the system of history onl y through
his acts of totalization.

T his characteristic of human

existence shows that men are interrelated , regardless of
the diachronical sense of physical existence.

O ne's

culture begins its evolution long before one is born.

�an

finds himself only through his relationship with this
environment which has been totalizing for generations.
O ne who lives in the present can experience this past
though prior to his existence, through the culture surround
ing him.

T hrough the cultural experience one in the
T his

present is connected internally with ancient people.

relations hip through one's culture is due to the totalization of encompass ing conditions by one's predecessors.
this culture which I call mine must be conceived
as specific participation in interiority in the
objective culture
A s s oon as I reflexively
grasp this bond of interiority which links me
to the cultural totalisation , I disappear as a
cultivated individual and emerge as the synth etic
bond between everyone and what might be called
the cultural field
.
In this wav I find mvself
dialectically conditioned by th e totall s ed and
totalising past of the process of human development:
•

_

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

�
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I totalis e mys elf on the bas i s of centries
of history and , in a ccorda nce with my culture ,
I totalise this experience. (CRD 5 4)
•

•

•

•

Sartre regards a n individua l as his temporalizing
activity and refers to this way of understa nding a s the
progress ive-regressive method.

To see a totality is to

comprehend its past and future simultaneously.

To see man

as he is is to see him a s he was regressively and as he
will be progressively.

O ne of Sartre's criticisms of

a nalytica l reasoning is tha t man and his a ction is treated
as a totality with a causal relationship.

Through dialecti-

cal development man and his action evolve into new entities
in future moments.

If we observe a person opening a window ,

we a ssume regressively that at a previous moment he felt
the need for fresh air and progress ively t hat soon he will
feel better upon meeting his need.

His act of opening the

window was not merely as it appeared.

It also contained

a past project to meet a need as well as an expected result.
For Sartre this method of reasoning is not mere contemplation ,
but calls for comprehension through dialectical reasoning.
History is the sum of individual totalizations.
This totality is not static but is evolving endlessly
toward the unknown future.

Thus , history as a dialectic

never ends in the sense that man's striving for completion ,
for totalization is never attained.

Every moment in the

process meets the negation of the present state.

20
Nevertheless this striving , this projective character
istic of man's thinking, is a crucial element in the
comprehension of man.

CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPT OF PRAXIS
An individual man is the subject of investigation of
huma n history.

Sartre's task in the Critiq ue is to

develop a social theory without losing this huma n subjectiv
ity.

"Without living ma n , " declares Sartre , "there is no

history.

The object of Existentialism--due to the default

of Marxism- -is the particular ma n in the socia l field , in
his class , in an environment of collective objects and of
other particular men." (SFM 133)

Sa rtre explains wha t

existentialism truly is in his "Existentialism is a Humanism"
and in Being a nd Nothingness.
One of the principles of existentialism , especially of
what Sartre calls atheistic existentialism , is that human
existence precedes one's essences.

This is contrary to

material objects whose properties (essence) precedes their
existence.

For instance when one wishes to create a desk

one must first ha ve knowledge of its possible use.
is a n element of its essence.

This

The process of production

and the properties of the desk , the wood and steel , determine
the essence of the desk before its appea rence as the
completed object , the desk.

Man conversely , exists prior

to a ll of his actions or his character.

::ran has essence

only by himself , only through his consciousness of a
totality.

The consciousness of being and of endless
21
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advancement toward being is the essence of man.

This

permanent fl ight toward totalization is never completed
but is simpl y the ongoing process an individual chooses
to make.
The principl e of existentialism is itsel f that of
human subjectivity.

Man makes himself; there is no other

power to create him , no God , no nature.

This subjectivity

is itsel f man's choice of his l ife and his environment.
As stated in Being and Nothingness , human subjectivity
which is free choice cannot be transcended.
condemned to be free.

Thus , man is

This freedom is not freedom to

act however one wishes , but the subjective role in one's
own l ife and in the whole world.

This subjectivity is

through and in human consciousness.
For human consciousness to function there must be an
object of consciousness.

Consciousness itself is "empty. "

It is onl y transcendent activity toward some object.
Al though Sartre is a disciple of Husserl ' s phenomenol ogy,
he doubts that man perceives an object, then the object is
regarded as it exists.

He insists that the existence of

something is prior to man ' s perception of it.

In Sartre's

terms , "consciousness is always consciousness of something
which is not consciousness itsel f. ''

(BN 9)

The consciousness

impl ies that there is something (being) before recognition.
To be conscious of something is through thinking of
what it is not.

If one sees a pen he knows it is a pen

because h e knows everything else which is not th e pen.

23
The pen is known by eliminating all other objects.

For

Sartre the activity of consciousness is negation.
Man's reality is his consciousness.

It is the

consciousness of something (being) but it itself is
nothing.

His consciousness has no inherent existence.

has no definite form but is free.

It

Indeed, consciousness is

freedom.
A ccording to Sartre freedom is manifested by anguish.
This anguish is due to man's responsibility for himself
and for all mankind.

Because existence precedes essence,

man has responsibility for choosing what he is and what
he makes of himself.

This choice includes all other men

in the individual's environment.

In this sense the

individual's responsibility extends to all mankind.
For every man, everything happens as if all
mankind had its eyes fixed on him and were guiding
itself by what he does. A nd every man ought to
say to himself, "A m I really the kind of man who
has the right to act in such a way � hat humanity
1
might guide itself by my action? "
Given this responsibility, man can realize, if he so
chooses, what he must do or what he must not do at aly
moment of his life.

Sartre asserts that the anguish man

experiences is the result of this responsibility, of man's
freedom. Conversely he argues that if man does not
experience anguish, it is simply because he has surrendered

16
sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism, " p. 7 6.
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his freedom and therefore lacks responsibility.
who escapes anguish is not free.

The man

This anzious development

of consciousness never reaches a finality.

He is never

considered " as an end because he is always in the making. "
Temporality is an essential element of human nature.
Therefore , essence is not provable in its present form
for it is an incomplete entity also reaching but never
gaining the future.

If one returns to observation of the

desk one perceives it not merely in its present , static
form but as a combination of many elements.

O ne perceives

its totalized properties , the human project which made it ,
and its future use for man.

This comprehension of the

future and the past emanates from the negation of the
present condition.

This is the basis of human action as

characterized by projectivity.
Human consciousness has no rigid structure , it is so
lacking in form that Sartre insists that it is N othingness
(No thing) .

This is because consciousness is freedom

itself , it is total possibility.

It has no limitation.

As man is his consciousness , he should not be defined only
as he sees himself through a mirror.

He is more that

what is seen in the mirror yet he is never complete,
always less than totalized.

Human consciousness is a

movement which never reaches its goal.

17

Ibid. , p. 8J.

This creature
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which never ends and is never defined , is man.

His

reality is Being-free. (BN 60)
This freedom is the freedom to choose.

Nlan chooses

what he is or what he will be and what he needs from the
outside world in order to exist.

"To be a consciousness

•

•

.

18
is to make choices at every moment while we are conscious."
Human activity within one's relationship with his
environment , including other people and material objects,
is in accordance with his chosen project.

This means that

human action is not accidental , but is projective , "a
conscious project. " (BN 5 5 9)

To project is to negate

the present and to go toward that which it is not yet.
The project , however , is not the cause of an act , but is
itself the development of reasoning and the act of transcendence of the present.
oriented

•

•

•

•

A project is "conscious and goal

Motivation for action does not come from an

actual state of affairs but from some possible state of
19
affairs in the future."

This sense of consciousness ,

freedom, and project as the intention to act moves from
one's individual ontology to social theory.

Sartre , in

his later work s , introduces the concept of praxis to explain
these three elements of social relationships.

18
R ichard J. Bernstein , Praxis and Action , Philadelphia,
The U niversity of Pennsylvania Press , 1971, p. 140.
19
G ila J. Hayim , The Existential Sociology of Jean
Paul Sartre , Amherst , The University of :11assachusetts Press ,
1980 , P• 48.
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For Hegel, reason (spirit) externally directs
cons ciousness to self-consciousness.

W hen one encounters

such absolute reas on, the history of human action ends.
Sartre, in rejecting this concept of external motivation by
absolute reason, accepts Marx's concept of praxis as human
This praxis is an intentional act which has a goal.

labor.

"P raxis -- is any meaningful or purpos eful human activity,
any act which is not mere random, undirected motion."
(SFM xvi)

It is intended to s urpass the present state.

"P raxis, indeed, is a passage from objective to objective
through internalization." (SFM 97)

This internalization,

of cour s e, occurs when one chooses s omething outs ide of
hims elf to be an object of his praxis.
"praxis

•

•

•

As McLeod explains,

is alm os t a s ynonym for existential freedom: it

is the freely chosen human project, an end- directed action,
in a s pecifically social context. "

20

It is an expression

of the practical mode of action in the social and historical
context.

It is the totalization, by which man defines

himself.

20

..
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Leod, p. JJ.

CHAPTER III
THE D IALECTICAL TOTALIZATION WITH MATTE R AND OTHE R MEN
Accordi ng to Sartr e i n Being and Nothi ngness, wi thout
the consciousness of man the wor ld has no meaning.

He

attempts i n hi s Cr i tiq ue, to explai n the necessi ty of
matter as "in-i tself, " as thi s concept i s explained i n
Being and N othingness.

He asserts that matter, as man's

exter nal condi tion of totali zation, has a different
meani ng than the mater i alists gi ve i t.

Matter i s not only

an i nert object, but the mediati on of man's di alecti c.
exists for man's praxi s.

It

In the Cri tiq ue Sar tre makes

clear that man makes hi stor y only i n the context of his
environmental condi ti ons.
threatened by scarcity.

Thi s man i s a social being

The effort to overcome scarci ty

is i tself man's totali zation.
The praxis of man i s i ntelligible only by interacti on
with his environment, the i nter i ori zes i t and si multaneously
exterior i zes himself.

The i nter acti on occurs when man

i nternali zes i ner t matter i nto the human world by using i t
as the instrument of hi s praxi s.

Wi thout matter man

cannot b e an agent of hi s own praxis.

Just as there i s no

di alecti c of nature wi thout human praxis, there i s no
di alecti c of human praxis wi thout matter.

Matter and

man's consci ousness play equal roles i n the di alecti c.
27
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Sartre states that : "man is 'mediated' by things to the
same extent as thi ngs are 'mediated' by man.

•

•

what is called dialectical circularity and,

•

•

•

This is

•

, it must

be established by di alecti cal i nvestigation." (CRD 79)
N eed is the beginning of the di alectic.

To meet hi s

needs man accepts the necessity of wor ki ng wi thin matter.
He sets his project towards acquiring his needs.

This

desire to gain what he desires forces him to wor k through
his praxis.
Everything is to explai ned through need
need i s the first totalising relation between
the material bei ng, man, and the materi al ensemble
of which he i s part. This relation i s univocal,
and of i nteriority. Indeed, it is through need
that the first negation of the negation and the
first totalisation appear in matter. (CRD 8 0)
•

•

Matter cannot relate to man through its own action.

•

;

Only

in and through man ' s praxi s does it become i ntelligi ble.
Labor is the means by which man attains his ends, the
production of that which he lacks.

Yet the frui ts of his

labor cannot be dis ti ngu ished apart from hi m si nce the
product is the result of man's project actuali zed through
labor.

One becomes the product of one's labor.

The

product is i tself the producer 's externali zed praxi s.
It i s i n this manner that man externali zes h i mself.

Di ck

Howard, i n "Existentiali sm and '!v1arxi sm, " explai ns that
"man externali zes hi s i nternal relati on to the external
world, and i n so doi ng negates i ts exter nali ty; man becomes
a bei ng-i n-the- world and the world becomes a being-for-

29
man. "

21

This statement expresses how much "things can

mediate human beings.

It also indicates that when human

22
beings become like things it is because of their own action. "
Man cannot lives solely with the products of his own
labor.

As his life becomes more complicated, and his labor

divided, he shares his benefits with others.
their products just as they desire his.

He desires

For Sartre, if

these needs were met then interaction would cease.

However,

because the perception of needs always exceeds the availa
bility of products scarcity is always present.
enough of everything.

There is not

This is the starting point of social

relations, of human beings and of history.
Men meet each other in the material field they have
produced.

Without the mediation of material things men

do not have any interrelationship.
by the mediation of their labor.

They recognize others
In other words, "matter

becomes t he condition of mediation which creates the possi
23
bility of social relation. "

The dialectical relationship

between man and matter and men's need for matter is the
starting point of the dialectic of human struggle.
21

nick Howard, "Existentialism and Marxism" in Towards
a New Marxism, ed. Bart Grahl and Paul Piccone, St. Louis,
Mos. , Telos Press, 1973, p. 10 9.
22
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D espite his stress on scarcity as the b asis of man's
interaction with his environment, Sartre concedes that
this is only one possibility of human history. (CRD 125 -27)
The influence of scarcity is limited to the contemporary
material social structure.
We have no way of telling whether, for different
organisms on other planets--or for our descendants,
if technical and social changes shatter the
framework of scarcity- -a different History,
constituted on another b asis, and with different
motive forces and different internal projects,
might be logically conceivab le." (CRD 125 )
Sartre says of our history "that it is b orn and developed
within the permanent framework of a field of tension
produced by scarcity." (Ibid.) Within this conflict man is
the enemy of everyone who threatens his possessions.
is the point at which social struggle begins.

This

Scarcity

(lack) of what men need causes conflicts among men in a
society to gain the scarce matter.

The conflicts lead to

the hostile recognition of one another and result in
negation of one another within each member's project toward
external world.

Sartre contends then that, "scarcity is

the negation of man through the presence of other men."

24

P ractice-inert
Sartre proposes a further illustration of the material
conditions relating to man.

He conceptualizes the material

24
vJilfrid Desan, Marxism of Jean-P aul Sartre, Garden
City, N.Y. D ouble day & Company, Inc., 1965 , p. 96.
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field not only as matter but also as the result of human
activity.
Man totalizes matter into his project toward the
outside world.

"Every praxis is primarily an instrumen

talisation of material reality.

It envelops the inanimate

thing in a totalising project which gives it a pseudo
organic unity. " (CRD 161)

Human praxis makes matter the

means of the actor's life and thereby gives inert being
an organic character.
By using the concept of "practice-inert" Sartre shows
clearly the historical relationship between human praxis
and the resultant matter.
affects man.

Human praxis upon matter also

Matter and material environment are the

result of man's initial praxis operated upon them; "matter
is inert; it is not an invention of the mind, but a
petrification of action." (CR D 171)

Man also struggles

For example, in the past Chinese

against his own praxis.

farmers made a human decision to d�forest the land to
increase cultivation.

A unexpected result of the

d�forestation, however, was increased floods.

This is the

circular character of the dialectic of man within material
conditions.

Once human labor meets matter and instrumen-

talizes it, he cannot control its result.
Men in society face this process within socioeconomic
and political contraints.

25

Yovel, p. 486.
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Human activity is restricted,
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limited by the practice-inert from the material environment.
Future activity is determined by the practice-inert
created from past praxis.

Here, the restriction is not

only caused by one's action but that of others as well.
The practice-inert is "the milieu in which actions meet."
(CRD 376)

It comprises not only the material field in

which man lives but all of his more abstract social
contracts as well.

The invention of the automobile, for

instance, is intended as a convenience in daily life.

The

use of the automobile, however, results in fatal accidents
and pollution, things which are not desirable.

These

results, both good and bad, come not only from one person's
will and praxis but from the desire of many people.
The result is not only one person's will but also
others who want the benefit of the automobiles.

Through

the practice-inert, the creation and use of the automobile,
an individual's praxis is intermingled with that of others.
The practice-inert is the expression of the materiality of
human beings in social relationships within the context of
scarcity.

Man is limited by the praxis of others within

the material field.

He is the product of his product.

Even though the materialized status of man is made
by man originally, he cannot control the subsequent
result.

;.:an's initial role in the world is hidden within

the material field.

Sartre maintains that only man's

initive makes these processes possible.

The transformation

33
of human praxis into the practice- inert is an inevitable
development within society.
Matter produced by man gradually determines his future
action.

He faces unavoidable restrictions on his actions

within the material structure of society.
objectified by his need for material goods.

Man himself is
It occurs

when his individual life interacts with the life of others.
The practice- inert is made only through the praxis of those
who commonly seek to reduce scarcity.

Thus, the practice

inert is the result of collective praxis.

Competition for

scarce goods is the necessary condition for dialectical
movement 1n
.
h.1story.

26

'The practice- inert is a counter against finality.
(CRD 193)

This means that totalized things do not stay

at their final point of the process of totalization; they
change the totalized state into the practice- inert, which
is a threat to the original praxis.

For example, the

industrialization of society affects the life of the rural
classes.

Through mechanization landowners can produce

more with less labor.

Mechanization results in the

unemployment of some workers and the reduction of wages
for those competing for fewer jobs.

Thus, the use of

machinery is a counter- finality for rural workers.

This

counter- finality to the rural workers is not as disasterous

26
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to landowners, for the interests of the two classes differ.
The practice- inert is a bridge between human conscious
2
ness and the reality of matter. 7

The practice- inert is,

for Sartre, the way that man departs from isolated indi
viduality and completes himself as a collective historical
being, for the dehumanization produced by society's
practice- inert stimulates men to protect themselves
collectively.
Serial Collectivity

Sartre rejects the Marxist definition of matter,
preferring to define it as the transformation of human
activity.

He thinks that the practice- inert negates human

dignity, generating what he calls "anti- praxis."

The

practice- inert is a moment in the transition of the
dialectic from the individual to the collective.

The

practice- inert "becomes, by and for men, the fundamental
motive force of History." (CRD 1 83)
The practice- inert results in alienation.

�·:an, for

example, sets his praxis in gold, endowing it with value.
Transporting, loading, unloading, and protecting gold gives
it more value.
labor earns it.

Man himself becomes gold insofar as his
The consequences of this are seen in

industrial society: though man creates and operates
machines, mechanized mass production makes him a slave to

27
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material abundance.

He becomes an object which is defined

by the product of his own labor.

In this state he is

merely an object, other than himself.
Sartre attempts to explain man's position within the
practice-inert field through a third observer.

Before man

recognizes others as having the same project as he does,
he is thoroughly isolated.

Men are, in Sartre's term, in

They have no relationship but indifference.

"seriality. "

Men in this state are defined as inert, nothing but inorganic
objects.

Sartre cites an example of a group of people in

a bus station.

They form a line for a "common aim": a bus.

Their commonality lies in living in the same district,
working in the same factory, or operating the same kind of
business.
of others.

Man in seriality exists in a mode of negation
Even though people in line do not realize their

mutual negation, they are made interdependent through the
practice-inert, the bus they are awaiting.

They do not

care who the other man is, what he does, or where he lives.
They are only whole as "a plurality of isolations. " (CRD 25 6)
They are different from each other in thinking and in
doing.
it.

They negate their mutual dependence by not realizing

They do not realize it is possible to depend on one

another in the practice-inert field.

They are in a unity

through the bus.
There may be an inadequate number of seats for all
of those in line, in which case everyone is the competitor
for a seat.

"As an ordering, it becomes a negative
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principle of unity and of determining everyone's fate as
Other by every Other as Other. " ( CRD 261 )

Everybody is

defined by the order which he has in line to get in the
bus.

If I were ninth in line perhaps I could take a seat,

but if I were tenth I could not.

I am tenth, and therefor e

without a seat, because of the other nine people before
me in a line.
I see the man as the Other, and, conversely, he sees
me as a mere object of his praxis.

This Otherness is

hostility in the context of scarcity.

More important, I

realize that I am the Other too, and this recognition makes
me feel alienated, outside of humanity.
At the same time there may be some identification
among the people in line.

This limited identification is

based on the awareness that others are also in line, and
that the bus is needed by them as well.

Yet this identifi-

cation is only recognization of the existence of the other .
There is no inter action beyond a superficial level.

"They

reciprocally deny any link between each of their inner
worlds. "

28

People in line for a movie, or in a mar ket, or

those who are listenting to the same message on the radio
are

all members of inert collectives which are gathered,

without common action, towards a common goal.
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The y are all Othe rs through the me diation of things.
A way from the inte riority of the individual, man stands
as an ine rt e xiste nce, an othe r among Othe rs.

Se riality

is characte rized by the Othe rne ss : fe el ing isolated,
powe rl e ss, impotent against the practice-inert.

Seriality

is the mode of e veryday life commonly e xpe rie nce d by
indepe nde nt individuals.

In the conte xt of scarcity and of

powe rlessness to control it, pe ople in ce rtain colle ctives
are al ie nated from their praxis.
A ll rel ationships among men are "me diated" by third
29
parties.

For Sartre , man cannot re cognize his inte gration

into the activity of othe rs by himse lf.

The mediator of

the e nvironme nt is a third party not re cognized by the two
actors.

For instance, I se e a man in line to by

a stamp

at a post office and a woman inside a window se lling a
stamp to the man.

The two persons know e ach othe r just

as the y are in that mome nt.

How the two pe rson's activitie s

are inte grate d into e ach othe r's proje ct toward e ach other ' s
outside world is see n onl y to a third man who l ooks at
the two actors yet is not recognized by them.

Each knows

that the opposite party does not know what he has be e n
doing, or thinking, or what he will do in the future .
Howe ver, the third man knows that even if the y do not care

29
The mediation of third party is first explained
in p. 106 in the Critiq ue, and this also appe ars in the
explanation of individual e xistence within group action
late r.
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about eac h other, they are al ready in a mutual rel ationship,
for they meet in their environmental c onditions .

This

does not mean men are al l indifferent to each other .
may be famil y, friends, or neighbors.

They

But they do not

recognize eac h other in the c ontext of each other's projec t
toward the outside world and of its mutual integration.
Their reciproc ity is recognized by a total izer in their
mil ieu.

Through the total ization of the environment the

third party sees the two other actors as the object of his
total ization.

This is the mod e of men's mutual connec tion

and its intel l igibil ity .

Everyone exists as both the third

party and the objec t of another third's praxis .
In the dialec tic al connec tion between men and their
environment, matter is the driving forc e of the human
d ial ectic.

Although matter and the material environm ent are

instrumental ized by man's praxis, they provide the ground of
history through man's mediation .

Matter as the field of

the practic e- inert seems to dominate man's praxis, making
it static and powerl ess .

Neverthel ess, Sartre c ontends

that man, through new ac ts of human freedom, c an c ounter
this inert serial ity.

Individual free praxis enc ounters

the sol ution of this serial ity by ac ting togather with
others.

CHAP'I ER IV
'I HE D IALECTICAL LINK BETW EEN IND I VI DUAL AND GR OUP
In this part of his Critique, Sartre attempts to
c onstruct his social theory.

In D esan's words, " it is the

c onstant purpose of Sartr e ' s book to make intelligible the
c ollective praxis, as he now attempts to do through tracing
the slow organization of the worker's c ollec tive and their
plan to reconstruct the soc ial field ...

3°

To be under stood in c oncrete terms, freedom must be
seen in r elation to its environment.

In soc ial theory

man is free insofar as his freedom is harmonized with
others.

In Odajnyk's term , Sartre gives meaning to man's

freedom in the sense that " his r esponsibilities and his
c hoic es are movements shared by the entire str uc ture in
whic h he lives."

3l

W ithin society's ec onomic and political life individual
interests differ.

Through the increase in mec hanization

landowners earn profits while workers are increas ingly
vu lnerable to underemployment or unemployment and poverty
because machines are replaced to man's labor.
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D esan, p. 127 .
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o dajnyk, p. 111.
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The working
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class is a collective whos e members share deprivation.
D aily life centered around the practico-inert, forces men
to lie in s erial powerles s nes s .

Sartre enters into an

inves tigation of s ociety from the perspective of clas s
dividion.

The oppress ion by the practico-inert aris es from

the economic or political s ystem.

Sartre anatomizes the

capitalis t s ociety in which there are definite class
distinctions.

The owners , for the mos t part, do not

realize the need to change the s ocial s tru cture, while the
workers want to change the present s ocial s ys tem.

Contrary

to the as s ertion of contemporary Marxis ts , Sartre does not
think that only the working clas s is the main force in
creating his tory.
between clas s es .

The force is the conflict and interaction
The oppressed want to be liberated from

oppress ive conditions.
world.

This is their need towards the given

This is the overriding need of the oppres s ed.

Sartre dis tingu is hes the collective from group.

T he

former is represented by a multitude of pas s ive individual
s eries , having no cons cious nes s of the pos s ibility of
common action even though it chances to gather around the
same p ractico-inert object.

T he latter, on the other hand,

though not organized around a common goal, is characterized
by action des igned to es cape its powerles s nes s in the
practico-inert field.

The latter's action reveals its elf

as continuous action and reaction between members.

In

is olated s eriality individuals cannot react to the actions
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of others s ince they do not re cognize be ing re late d to one
another .

Eve rybody is Othe r .

As Other, eve rybody e xp e ri

e nce s alie nation and imp otency toward the p owe r which make s
them ine rt .
Whe n fe e lings of alie nation be come virtually unbe arable ,
an individual reacts agains t this s ituation.

The n p e op le

indepe nde ntly re acting to the s itu ation s oon p e rceive a
common des tiny .

The re mus t be an e xternal s timu lus to

force one to find othe rs with a common p light .

P ove rty or

political oppre s s ion ofte n p rovides this s timu lus .

On

Ju ly 12, 178 9 citizens of Paris rose agains t their
governm e nt .

Individu al fe e lings of oppre s s ion we re s hare d .

T he re was an invis ible conne ction be twe e n thos e individu al
e xp re s sions of dis conte nt .

As the degre e of oppre ssion and

angu is h is incre as e d, p e op le gathe r more cohes ive ly.

In

such a gathe ring, thou gh p e op le have common fe e lings , the y
do not as yet s hare a common cou rs e of action.

This is

the s tate of what Sartre calls the "group-in-fu s ion . "
Group- in- fus ion
The ne ce s s ary condition to be a group is to regard
common nee d as individu al ne e d .

In the ir s tru ggle to

su rvive p e ople su ddenly s e e in their e nvironme nt that the re
are othe rs who have the s ame des ire and dete rmi nation to
act agains t a give n dange r or f or a pe rce ived ne e d .

As

s c atte red individuals , as s e rie s , people in a collective
re alize their common powerle s s ne s s .

In a group, however,
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people regard each individual aim as the common aim.

E ach

believes that the common objective is nothing more than his
own objective.

As Sartre says,

the group constitutes its elf on the bas is of
a need or common danger and defines itself by the
common objective which determines its common
praxis. Yet neither common need, nor common praxis,
nor common objectives can define a community
unless it makes itself into a community by feeling
individual need as common need, and by projecting
itself, in the internal unification of a common
intergration, towards objectives which it produces
as common. ( CR D 35 0)
•

•

•

Each individual chooses his position, or the limit of his
freedom, in becoming a member of the community.

In order

to protest government abuse, for example, one group of
people demonstrates in the streets, while another group
destroys government property .

E ven though both are acting

toward the same goal and against a common enemy, they are
not yet unified in acting.
order which many obey.

On impulse, one man issues an

Another man issues a second,
There are many

independent order which others follow.

groupings and regroupings based on scattered words or
actions.

T his is the action of the group in fusion.

Everybody is a leader and a follower.
to which order he will subm i t.

Each person chooses

He spontaneously limits

his freedom to join the common action, identifies his aim
with the common aim, and his project with the common project.
Sa rtre calls this "self- determination. "
of ser ial otherness is replaced
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Howard, p. 114.

by

Here, "the stru cture

a fusion of the Same. 32
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U nlike those in the serial collective , in which each is
Other to everyone else , in a fused group everyone recogniz es
his neighbor as himself.

They become brothers facing a

common external threat.
The mutual interaction between group member is recog
niz ed by a mediator.

The third man who mediates between

the interaction of two parties is a member of a group in
fusion.

There may be as many thirds as there are people in

the c rowd in fusion.

The voic e directing other men's

actions is a totalizer.

By shouting "go to the B astille"

a man becomes a leader of the movement toward the Bastille.
For in a group in fusion anyone may be the mediator or the
mediated.

There is no partic ular leader.

A nyone may order

the group to act in a certain way and in so doing totalize
the common action.

A ll members of a such group in fusion

are no longer a series but not yet part of an organized
group.

The existence of this group is possible only through

the mediation by members as thirds who unite other individ
uals with a common purpose.

Futhermore each member is

recogniz ed as a member through the mediation by the group
as whole.

The latter mediation means that one receives the

status of a member once it is recognized that he shares
the common aim of the group.
P ledged Group
After achieving a common goal, individuals in the
group in fusion lose the need to remain united with other
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men.

Insofar as the group in fusion is characterized

by the individual ' s free limitation of his freedom to
gain another greater freedom, the group then dissolves
itself into another serial collective.
When people gather to achieve a common goal, the group
is the means of composition of common action.

The group

action arising from the anxiety of powerlessness is dissolved
either when the goal of the action is achieved successfully
or when the enemy against which the group acts is not
affected by that action.

O ne example of such group action

is the conquest of the Bastille by citizens of P aris.

After

they had conquered they were faced with a crucial choice of
either returning to their serialized lives or letting the
government suppress them again.

They did not want either.

The people in the group sought to attain the group cohesion,
released from seriality and protected from further oppression.
In spite of this desire of men for unity another
danger from within arises.

The group in fusion is defined

as a multiplicity of individual praxis.

This multiplicity

is endangered when threatened by disintegration from within.
The internal need to maintain a bond may manifest itself as
a spontaneous action, a compulsion.

It is deemed necessary

that individuals swear loyalty to the permanent structure
of the group.

To retain membership in the group one is

continuously asked to limit individual freedom in deference
to the common goal.
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Despite t he fact that each member o f the "pledged group "
acts according to the direction of the group itself, Sartre
nevertheless claims that t he action of the pledge is
necessary and is the free choice by the individual t o protect
himself from danger.

Through the action of a pledge t he man

as a mediating third is locked into the inertia of pledge.
By swearing fidelity the individual is released fro m
the fear of being alone.

A t t his stage there are but two

choices: the limitation of the pledge or alienation.

As

"a free limit of freedom" in Sartre ' s words, everybody as
a third p arty swears his loyalty.

The third p arty as a

mediator becomes the regu lator watching for bet rayal
By making a pledge to protect all

from within t he group.

members from external enemies all members are equal, so
that one is gu aranteed freedom from betrayal as one guaran
tees t he same freedom to others.
other third ' s pledge.

My pledge gu arantees

The pledge is made by a third t o

every other third party.

"It is at this level of integra

tion that the social group is born . ..

JJ

For Sartre,

however, this is still b y a free hu man choice that each
individual is restricted by group membership.

I n the

objectification of a written pact t he members are released
et ernally from returning to the former state (seriality)
"it is t he eternal, frozen preservation of its rising. "
(CR D 4J6)

JJ

The necessity of a pledge shows that there is

Hayim, p . 94 .

46
always the possib il i ty of be trayal .

The group in fus i on i s

composed o f individual actions and is a spontaneous limita
tion of individual freedom .

In the pledged group , however ,

the individual is the means of group power its elf .

There

is only the group praxis that the individual mus t fol l ow .
A t this l evel the group i s the end i tself , the symbol of
cohes ion .

This group does not call for voluntary alignment ,

but force s members to s tay .

This is expressed by the fear

of terror .
Through terrorism , permanent membersh ip is guaranteed .
T error is exercised e i ther through phys i cal force or s imply
by the elim ination of one ' s name from the membership ,
meaning a return to al ienation and powerl e s sne s s .
I t is s till true that my pl edge is a guarante e
for the other third party a but the meaning o f this
guarante e i s pre cisely violence . The th ird party
is guaranteed aga ins t my fre e betrayal by the
right whi ch I have granted everyone ( including
him ) to eliminate me in the event of my failure ,
and by the T error whi ch the common righ t e s tabl ish e s
with in m e and whi ch I have demanded ; and this
guarante e- -wh ich deprives h im of any excu s e in
the event of dispersal of betrayal- -means that
he can fre ely guarantee his own s ol idari ty ( fre ely
demand T error for h ims elf ) . ( CRD 4JJ )
The terror i s call ed the " fraternity- terror . "
R egulat i on is neces sary to bind pledged members as bro thers
and s isters .

If there is a traitor , the res t of the

membersh ip may become lynchers .

The viol ence by the

lynchers is " T error aga ins t the traitor " and " a practical
bond of l ove between the lynchers . " ( C RD 4)9 )

Fre edom

s till exists among the members becau s e viol enc e to ma intain
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grou p s ecurity is a free relationship among members.
Fraternity- terror is itself a protection of the members
against s eriality.

In a word, the intelligibility of the

group comes about from the character of violence for the
common freedom.

The common freedom "as a common s tructure

is the permanent violence of individual freedom of aliena
tion. " ( CRD 441 )
T he result of the collective action was a totality
by group praxis .

There could then occur an anti- finality,

a return t o the s tate of s uppression b y t he exis ting
oppressing power.

S ince the fus ed group has no further

reason for group activity, the fear of the counter-finality
leads t he members to t he cohes ive status .
group is s till in fus ion.

T he pledged

T his the beginning of the process

of institutionalization.
Organization
T he process of development from the fused group to a
more mechanized grou p is called organization.

The group is

not a totality, but t he organized activity of its members.
S artre defines organization as "a distribution of tasks .
And it is the common objective (common interest, com mon
danger, common need assigning a common aim) which defines
praxis negatively and lies at the origin of this different i
ation. " ( CRD 446 )

Grou p members are divided by either

their pro�essional skill or their assigned functions,
depending on the group ' s aim.

The member is the function
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h e performs
members .

and the function is the means of l inkage between

The funct i on a s the distribu t i on of tasks "remains

an inert l imit of the fre edom of the third party , and ,
therefore , its bas is is s till T error . " (CR D 449)

T error

reappears whenever the l inks b e tween various functions s e ems
to have broken down .

The organi zation i s its elf an act of

the group toward a more c oncrete stage of c oll e ct ive action.
One c omprehends the O ther by the funct i on he performs .
Through the mutual r elationship between our tasks in the
group we are l inked to each other , and , colle c +.ively the
l inks cons t itu te group .

It is very s imilar to the system

of the human body as a functional phys i ol ogical uni t .
Interrelated functions are elements forming an organi zed
set.

What we must remember , h owever , is that s o c ial

functions in groups are no t exactly like tho s e of natural
organism s .

For the latter i s s elf-produ ced activity , wh il e

the former is produced by o ther authors .
exampl e of a s o ccer team .
own pos i tion .

Sartre uses the

On a team , each player has his

Each memb er acts not by his own will , but

a c cord ing to the function of th e pos ition.

The duty of

the goalkeeper is different from that of a forward .

O ther

functions are ass igned by third parties who may be coaches ,
spe ctators , or other players .

The members l imit th e ir

freedom in the intere st of the team effort .

The game

its elf i s total i zed by a player kicking the ball and
dire cting the next act ion of a teammate .

In d ir e cting the

ball to ano ther player , one total i z e s the activity of the
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player who receives it and the act ivity of the team as a
In t his sense,

whole, with victory as the final goal.

each member at some point determines by his judgement and
actions the fate of the entire t eam.

Conversely, the

actions of the player are determined by his role within
the team.

The function of an individual is itself a tool

of the group ' s goal.

He is the common individual who is

characterized by the group spirit .

One ' s freedom is

realized through a united effort directed t oward a common
aim.

The sacrifice of one ' s freedom in difference to team

victory is a prerequisite of participation in the game .
The t ot al it y of each player' s role o r action i s itself the
group ' s unity, "and in serving t he common undertaking
everyone turns out to be serving him. " ( CRD 460 )

•

•

•

This is,

for Sartre, p ractical and necessary to accomplish the common
goal.

This spontaneous limitation of one ' s freedom is his

free choice to stay with the group.
Sartre claims that the individual in an organization
merely changes the quality of his freedom from ontological
state to social.

As a social being, free man is absorbed

more and more into relative freedom with other men.

Sartre,

in speaking of group freedom, asserts that, "the freedom is
not free activity of an autonomous organism b ut, from its
origins, a conquest of alienat ion

•

•

•

•

"

(CR D 5 5 8)
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Common Praxis
Since there are some t hings which an individual cannot
do by himself , a group is formed t o do it by collective
power.

By involving himself in a group activity , an indi•

vidual r ealizes that the common project is the same as his
own individual projects.

The formation of a group is a

means to achieve the common project as my pr oject.

This is

the condition of common action.
Sartre proposes a method for the comprehension of group
action as a single entity.

D ialectical invest igation is

the method to understand "the practical relations of
individual functions within the organised group. " (CR D 5 0 5 )
The relation is a group .

The group praxis "belongs t o

every individual praxis as an interiorized unity of multiplicity." (CRD 5 0 6)
A s a group is organized , the common activit y reveals
organized form .

Here, the common praxis as the plurality

of individual praxis is "synthetic tempor alisation of the
organization." (CRD 507 )

A group is seen as a t ot al ity in

process never to be completed.
praxis as totalizing action.

It is the unity of individual

Therefore the tota lization of

the group is comprehended as a unity of individual t otali
zation.

Sar tre mentions the relationship between individual

and grou p praxis in the following manner :
common a ction and individual -nraxis exhibit
a real homogenei ty.
The individual would be unable
t o understand either his own common action in terms
•

•

•
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of the totalis ing praxis of group, or that of a
group external to hims elf, if the s tructures of
common praxis were of a different order than thos e
of indivi dual praxis . I f the objectives of the group
had a hyper-indi vidual character , then the
individual would never be able to gras p them. This
does not mean that the common action is an organic
s ynthesis of the members of the group but, on the
contrary, that the group, far from having hyper
individuality in its action, s ets i ts elf objectives
of an individualis ed s tructure and can achieve
them only through common operations which are
individual in character. ( CR D 50 9 )
I n s um, common praxis is the whole of different totalizing
actions of individual members.

Since the unity, however,

is toward one and common goal it can be s een as one
s ynthetic praxis .

This group action is s een a s a s i ngle

entity by those in other groups or by i ndividuals who are
not grouped.

When one s ees, for example, a group of

people playing mus ical i ns truments to perform a s ymphony,
he s ees their playing as a s ingle action.

They are integr

ated into each other's play to achieve a common aim- -a
symphony.

They appear as one project.

Even though the

player i nteriorizes his and his collegu es' goals s eparatively, to an observer i t appears as a s ingle action.
Individual praxis is the model of group praxi s that is
percei ved by other groups or non-grouped i ndividuals as a
s i ngle entity.

The group is not s ome s upra power controll

ing the individual.

The collective acti on i s formed b y

voluntary i ndi vidual effort.
The group's choice of a goal na turally occurs i n the
dialectical process of i ndividual's choice.

Par ti cipati on
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i n group action i s nothing more than indi vidual c hoi c e ,
that i s , one's praxis toward the outs ide world.

In group

acti vi ty the i ndivi dual i denti fi es other men with hims elf,
and feels that he is a "common i ndi vidual , " a member.
Thus , to form a group praxis the i ndi vi dual mus t be
able to find his end in the c ommon aim .

In so doing

obedi ence to the c ommon ob j ec t i s "nothing more than the
c ommon acc eptance of the s ame s oluti on, ac c ording to whi c h
a s oluti on i s mine to the extent that i s the s oluti on of m y
neighb or.,, J4

The group i s a product o f the organi c praxis

of each member .
Like man as an organi c b eing , the group has an i nterna l
li nk b etween members and their i nteri ori z ation or mediation
of group i nteracti on.

The differenc e li es in the fact

that the former c ons ti tutes its praxis b y its own produc ti on ,
while the latter is c onstituted b y the form er ' s praxis .
The acti vity of the former animates the latter , and endows
it wi th organi c characteristics.

Nevertheles s , the group

i s s ti ll i norgani c , exis ti ng only through indi vi duals who
s erve as third mediators .

While individual praxis i s

totali z i ng activity by a project , group praxis is made b y
other organi c authors and the di rection of ac ti vity is
dec i ded b y the i nternali z ing ac ti vi ty of i ndivudual memb ers.
The latter , therefore , has no projec t of its own.

Group

ac ti on i s c ons ti tuted by human praxis , and it is not mere
pass ivity .
J4

D es an , p. 17 4 .
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As the reciprocity between two persons is recognized
o nly by the mediation of a third p arty , a group as interre
lation between its members is recognized only by other
groups or individu al s who are not grouped.

In the p ost

office , the cl erks inside the windows are members of
the group onl y in the eyes of customers outside the windows.
A t the same time the clerks view the cu stomers as a group.
Each group sees the opp osite as an objective entity.
Withou t an other party p erceiving the group as a group one
does not exist.

In the p ost office , I , a customer, see

the clerk who serves me as a member of a gr oup and mediate
between the cl erk as a common individual and the service
of the group as a whole.

O nly through my recognization

that he is a member of a group and that h is service is the
common aim of the group d oes the group exist.

E ach group

is the object of the totalization of the other.

Th e reci

p rocity between groups is the basis of the dialectical
development of the interaction between d ifferent groups.
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Institu ted Group
A s groups evol ve , they gradu all y tu rn to centralized
au th ority.

In the fused group each individu al is th e

regul atory third who can direct collecti ve action; everyone
is equ al .

35

Each member mediates other's integration into

Hayim, p. 116.
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group action.

When I totalize individuals, within group

action , I am totalized b y them.

This unity in a fused

group suggests that the group is easily ruptured .

As it

becomes larger and its distribution of functions between
memb ers becomes more c omplex , it must be institutionalized.
Institutions are c haracterized b y hiarachical form.

Man

encounters another seriality as a group bec omes organized.
All members are sub j ec ts , and , at the same time , obj ec ts of
group action.

As the group becomes organized , members

become the means by which organization is achieved .
this stage, each member is mediated by others.
is deepened.

At

Seriality

In a more institutionalized group "onc e those

who the � again

•

•

•

have become simultaneously and

secretly O thers , alterity becomes the secret truth of unity
for everyone. " ( CRD 59J )

Sartre asserts that the inert

unity in the institution is "the struggle of freedom
against

an

internal revival of seriality. " ( CRD 5 9 8 )

Because of the repetition of seriality and its inevitability ,
Sartre remarks , "it is beginning to appear that the
movement of the investigation may possible be circular. "
(CRD 5 9 1 )
The institution is a new way to regulate the betrayal
of individuals.

But it is also a dialectical nec essity .

Sartre explains the transition from the group in fusion to
the institution in terms of temporalization.

The proc ess

from serialized group to fused group and back again is

55
circular.

It is the endless flight toward the future.

In

S artre • s wordss " the group creates itself in order to
create and destroys itself by creating itself. " (CRD 5 90 )
As the scale of the group becomes larger, the conflicts
between sub-groups become more comp lica ted.

Bureau cracy in

modern society appears as a systematically regulatory
structure to control the arising sub- groups th rough its
d ivisions of roles and hiarachical centralization.
I n a fused group everybody is sovereign.

But a

bureaucracy needs concentration of power for controlling
traitors.

As the power of regulation is concentrated,

it becomes authority.

This authority need not be a

p articular sovereign p ower.

Within group in fusion every

member regulates everyone else.

All are equal as mediators,

thirds, and as such are co-sovereigns.

Everyone also is

capable of betrayal under unre� trained free fusion as well
as is regulator.

To maintain permanent group coh esiveness

and t o d ef end against betrayal , it is necessary t o centralize
all regu latory authority.
members cede their rights.
sovereign.

By accepting a single regu lator,
Authority is granted t o one

The sovereign may be one man or one well

organized group like a political party.

If there is one

leader, he interiorizes the multiplicit y of third parties
in the group.

Th at is, all th ird regu latory power is

centralized in him.

"He is a universal mediation, and he

destroys reciprocity wherever it exists, and relat ions
between t ranscended third parties cannot establish themselves
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e xcept through his mediation . " ( CRD 6 2J )

By obeying h i s

order , o ther third parties b e c ome the product o f his
s overe ignty .

For Sartre , this sovere ign author ity is not

a super p ower , bu t is a cons equence of human act i on s ince
it resul ted only from memb ers ' conc eding the ir rights .
In a bureaucracy , sub- groups and individuals wh o are
not part of a group are dir ected by the s overeign .

Sub

groups mus t function as a mediation betwe en the top
authority and the s erial bottom in the pyramid .

In the

bureaucrat i zed s tru cture , h owever , the s overe ign ( top
leadership ) keeps trying to maintain hiarachi e s which
prevent sub-groups and non-grouped individual s from acting
independently and thereby threatening the s overeign ' s
monopoly on power .
Sartre critici zes S tal inism as the model of one-person
bureau cracy .

For Sartre revolution can b e succeed only by

an oppressed clas s through i ts spontaneous upris ing .

The

C ommuni s t Party once in power constitutes a new dominant
class with i ts own bureaucra cy , wh ich inevitably turns
away from carrying out the revolution and ins tead concen
trates on cons olidating its own power .
The disscuss ion up to thi s point has deal t with the
intelligibil ity of colle ctive praxis as the s olut ion of
individual isolat ion.

A s an individual is involved in mor e

ins tituti onal i zed group action , the fre e ind ividual praxis
of a group member becomes unimportant : his function in a
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group is what he is .

Group praxis appears as external

determination of individual members ' praxis .

There is

endl e s s e ffort to be liberated from the s erial ity .

This

cycle of endl e s s interaction of s erial i zed individuals and
groups i s history its elf .

CHAPTER V
C ONCEPTUALI ZAT I ON OF HIST OR Y
A s a dial e c tic develops from a n individual entity into
a group ent ity , the individual , s tirring to meet his needs
in the outside world , accepts the interi or i zation of his
environment as his pro j ec t .

Fac ing s carc ity , the individual

be comes the O ther to men who have the same pro j e ct f or
survival .

Matter produced by man returns to man as the

inert resul t of man ' s praxis .
mediated by matter .

R e cipro c ity b e tween men i s

They re cogni z e each o ther as an obj e c t

of each individual to tal i zation.

This s o c ial relationship

begins the ob j ectification of human praxis .

One ' s praxis

toward h i s environment i s diss olved as an ob j e ct by the
other ' s praxis .

To countera ct the impo tency of the individ

ual , men who have a common a im in a given s o c ial s i tuation
gather to s olve the ir problems colle ctively .

None theless ,

no matter what type of coll e ctive actions are exercised ,
Sartre cla ims they can have the ir meaning only in and
through the individual man as the agent of all re c ipro c i ty .
The very beginning o f re c ipro c ity i s the condition that
" man is a practical organism l iving with a multipl i ci ty
of s imilar organi sms in a field of s carc ity . " ( CRD 7 35 )
No one in s o cial relationsh ips can avo id confl i cts or
cooperation wi th environmental conditi ons , including o ther
men.
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Society is like a pot filled with different s erialized
groups and individuals .

A s oc iety its elf is the collective

of individuals who s tand s ide by side in reciproc ity with
one another .

The dis tinct elements of a s ocial s tru c ture

are revealed in the relationship of groups and s eries .
( CRD 6J5 )

There are endless c yc lical movements from the

group to the s eries and back again.
achieve a goal.

A group is formed to

When the goal is achieved, the grou p

generally dis s olves into s eries, which may onc e again be
formed into a group when a new goal is made.

In highly

organized groups, man ' s s eriality is deepened by the manip
ulation o f the s overeign group, the ruling elite.

The

group is diss olved in the attempt by the members to regroup
as individuals .

This may o c cur at any point in s ocial life.

History is the dialectic in which grou ps come from a
s eries , to which they eventually return .
are indifferent to each other .

In this s tate men

Men in s eries act to negate

their being, which is made the ob j ect of another's proj ect.
A group is formed when men in a s eries feel an impotency
which they attempt to overcome .

These movements between

the s tates of groups and s er ies occur dialectically, as we
have s een.

It is the result of totalizing activities of

grou ps and s eries .
The his tory of the individu al's s ocial life, ac cording
to Sartre, begins with an isolated individu al, existing
in the practic e-inert field.

It evolves towards the

creation of a grou p in fus ion, the appearanc e of an organized
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group , and a return to the original s tate .

With in the

context of history , groups are quas i-actors , as c ons tituted
praxis derived from individual constitutive praxis .

The

group is the unity of multiple individual pro j e cts .

Human

individual ity is comprehended with in the group entity .
Individual total i zation is replaced by group total i zation .
The group is the only way to gain practical freedom in
s ocial l ife .

The group is the means by wh ich man cooperates

in order to survive .

I t is "� mode of existence :

•

•

•

the

group is both the most effe ctive means of c ontroll ing the
surrounding material ity in the c ontest of s carcity and the
absolu te end as pure freedom l iberating men from alterity . "
( CRD 67 3 )
The group has a continuou s relationsh ip with serial
men who are not yet group ed .

For instance , a xollection o f

s erial individuals who desire t o gain coll e ct ive power
could form the ir own group .
existing power .

Thi s new group oppos e s the

If the new group destroys the old , the

latter returns to a s eries .

Likewise , if the new group is

suppres s ed by the old , the former is interior i z ed by the
latter-- that is , dissolved into the series .

R egardl e s s of

whi ch resul t is a ttained i t is not lasting .

I nevitably

the new group will face o ther challenges e i ther from within
or from with out whi ch will e i ther be suppressed and absorbed
or will prevail and thereby begin the pro cess anew by
oppos ing other s erial individuals .
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With in th e organization , the distribution o f tasks and
the fear of fraternity- terror transform c ommon freedom into
a me chani zed s tru cture .

Individual s and sub-groups are

manipulated by the attempt of the inst itutional i zed
l eadership to permanently rul e .

This activity b e comes

externally determined and the sub- groups and individual s
rel inquish the ir own judgement .

In thi s c ontext , man is

al ienated from his own l oyal ty to the group and is sub j e ct
to the supervis ion of a more inhuman and me chani zed terror .
From thi s s erial ity a new need for prote ction arise s .
Between the exis t ing and the resis ting powers one party
total i z e s the other .
o f i t s praxis .

One recogne zes the other as an ob j ec t

The recipro c i ty is i ts elf a dial e ctical

movement .
By c ircularity Sartre means that the s tates of s eries
and group are repeated , not with same content byt only with
the same form .

T h e circularity is n o t the re currence of

the same c ontent of action in the same s i tuati on .

S ince

everything is interconne cted d ial e ctically and is evolving
One

toward an unknown future , there is no final s tate .

cannot de termine wh ich s tate pre cedes the o ther between the
group and the s eries .

They are all on a circl e .

There is

no given pri ority ; " they are rec ipro cally produ ct and
producer , in continual interacti on and modification .

J6
Howard , p . 1 0 1 .

..

J6

•
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The s erial ity is never e l iminated .

A ccording to

Sartre ' s logi c , if the group never faces diss olution into
the series , history s t ops there .

For the alienated s erial ity

is caused by a perception of s carc ity whi ch can never be
el iminate d .

In indu s trial s o c iety class distinctions are

qu ite deep , with the population divided b e tween capital i s ts
and workers .

Such a s o c i e ty can be def ined as a c ontainer

of different classes .

There is a reciprocal re cogni tion

between class e s just as there is between individuals and
between group s .

That is , through the exis tence of another

class one class recognizes its own existence and s ee s i ts
own interests as different from the o ther .

The interaction

between classes is the dial e ct i cal exchange of each clas s ' s
praxis as a whol e .
C las s as an interior bond b e tween members is composed
of ins titutional i zed groups , fus ed groups , and series .
As a container of ea ch different total i zation , a class ,
unl ike the group , does not operate as a s ingle actor .

It

i s rather a who l e d e t e rmined by th e behavior of ea ch a ctor

who recogni zes that he is a class be ing acting within his
class interests .

The exi s tence of the class reveals itself

on three different l evel s .

A class is a mul tipl i city of

groups and s eries interacting with one ano th er and s eeking
a common goal .

The organi zed group with in a class ( for

exampl e , trade unions in th e working clas s ) acts in the
interest of the class to change the existing s o c ial

6J
s tru cture .

The trade union i s itself " th e working class

ob j e ctified , exterioris ed , ins titutional ised and poss ibly
bureaucratised

•

•

•

• "

( CRD 682 )

A s a fus ed group i ts

action s e eks to ach ieve the goal s of the class .

Among the

workers c olle c tively this l evel of activity aris e s at a
moment o f unbearabl e tens ion .
pledged groups s erve as

These inst itutional i zed or

apparatus f or clas s interests .

an

Both of the s e l evel s , the organized and fused group , c ome
from the s erial ity .

There are als o s erial ind ividual s wh o

are no t in fused or institu ti onal i zed groups , but are
class-beings acting with in the common a im .

The comb ination

of the organi zed group s erving as the vanguard or active
force , with a fus ed group as the l o cus of c ommon action and
the s erie s as the origin or group formation , c omprises a
class .

The dial e ctical reciproc i ty between the s e elements

of the class creates a practical uni ty b e tween members .
Thes e different l evels exist anywhere , and at any time
wi th in the same class .
S ince a clas s is the total ity of total i zation of the
three l evels in pro cess , an individual in s eri e s is affected
by the o ther two l evels .

C oncomi tantly , he affe cts them ,

e i th er as they interiori ze h im or are diss olved into o ther
s eries .

The reciprocity wh ich exists in the relationship

b e tween the three levels is understood only through
dial e c tical comprehens ion .
two through its own praxis .

One l evel total i ze s the oth er
The exchange of praxis among
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l evel s is a dial e ct i cal movement , for each l evel can recog
ni ze i tself through recognition of the other two .

Each

l evel is praxis and , at same time , the ob j e ct of praxis .
In a word , a class is , as a whol e , a s ingle praxi s h olding
a s ingle pro j e ct wh ich man " produce i ts elf differently at
different practical l evel . " ( CRD 690 )

A class is the unity

of many different temporal i zat ions by many different
sub j ects .
The intell igibil ity of class action, for Sartre , is
accompl i sh ed only by the dial e ctical comprehens ion of the
individual man .

As an observer outs ide a class and an agent

of the recipro cal action within a class or in relat ionship
with other classes , the individual man is the only total i z er
of class actions .
The relationship among classes in a s o c iety is the
exchange of praxis of tho s e clas ses .

A s o c i e ty is a

container of all levels of recipro city betwe en and among
individuals , groups and classes .

In capital i s t s o c i e ty , the

confl ict between empl oyers and workers emanates from the
unequal distribution of benefits and contradictory efforts
to maintain the pres ent structure or to des troy or change
it .

This class s truggl e resul ts from the effort by one

clas s to overc ome the al ienation cau s ed by the adversary ' s
actions .

In this ins tance , workers are al iena ted by the

expl o i ta t ion of the bourge oisie .

The rea ction of the

bourge o i s i e agains t the upris ing of the working class is
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als o dial e ctical .

Generally class s truggl e is unders tood

in the context of the dial e ctical re ciprocity mediated by
matter .

I n this example , the recipro cal relationsh ip is

mediated by capital .
its pro j e ct .

One clas s total i z e s the other into

The starting po int of recipro c i ty i s the

awarenes s of the adversary as O ther .

One s e eks to interi-

ori z e the o ther ' s fre edom into one ' s own .
I n the context of s carcity , his tory is ultimately the
totali zation of all s truggl e s between different interests
in the material field .

S truggl e begins when one party

tries to s t ifle the o ther ' s fre edom to further its own
pro j e c t , and the latter reacts .

Sartre refers to violence

in broad terms resembl ing what we might c ons ider c onfl ict

•

.

Thus , praxis as human fre edom is naturally violent with in
I n the pres ence

the recipro c i ty mediated by inert matter .

of s carc i ty , human praxis is a " struggl e " for l ife , a fight
to satisfy one ' s perce ived nee ds .

( C RD 7 36 )

This violent

struggl e is one of " freedom against fre edom through the
mediation of inorgani c matter . " ( Ibid . )

One ' s opponent in

su ch a s truggl e may be any other man who threatens one ' s
fre edom , and thus b e c omes " anti-men , " or even one ' s
" Brother in s o far as he has the permanent possibil i ty of
becoming anti-human himself . " ( CRD 7 36-37 )

Through

total i z ing activi ty one ' s praxis dissolves the other ' s .
One who wants to be an O ther by es caping from the serial
state into an organi zed group fa ces the terror produced by
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fraterni ty .
s e cede .

O ther members violently deny h i s right to

This fraternity- terror is the fre edom of the rest

of the members agains t the fre edom of the ir brother .
With ou t the recognit i on by an individual that the adversary
is al s o a free entity , that the pres ervation of one ' s own
freedom entail s in s ome way the negation of the o ther
freedom , re ciproc i ty does not exi s t .
Prior to a s truggle b e tween two parties there is an
awarenes s that one ' s adversary has the same pro j e c t one has .
This party synth e s i zes the adversary ' s action and interior
i zes it into its own pro j e c t .

R eferring , as an exampl e , to

a che s s game , Sartre illustrates the inter- c omprehens ion of
two players .

By ant i c ipating his opponent ' s s trategy for

victory , a player devises an appropriate response to deny
that goal .

The moves of the c ompe ting players are call ed ,

by S artre , " a s eries of negative and predictabl e reaction . " ·
( CRD 81 J )

The s carc ity of opportunities for victory forces

one to negate the aim of the o ther .

The judgement to move

one ' s pie ce is generated from a regress ive remembranc e of
pas t actions of the o ther as well as from a progress ive
prediction of his fu ture movements .

The relation between

two players throughou t the game is the exchange of praxis
in order to synth e s i z e each other ' s temporal decisions and
actions .
Man makes hi story , and history as a total i z ing condition
limits man ' s actions .

The given social conditions man
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faces afte r birth have b e e n made prior to his birth by
pre vious ge ne rations .

Man is b orn with in his tory .

He is

the agent of the dial e ctical devel opment of h is tory through
the interiorization of the give n social conditions as
history , whil e h is totalization is l imited b y the s ocial
conditions which have been create d before his inte riorization.

History as the total ity of the pas t , pre sent and

future of man is not onl y the product of human action but
als o the b as is on which man acts and is conne cted with other
men in all ge ne rations , pas t , pre s e nt and future .
The s ubje ct matte r of the Critiq ue is the re ciprocity
of actors in the dial ectical move ment of his tory and its
intell igibil ity .

The comprehe nsion of his tory is poss ible

onl y by a dial e ctical inves tigation of human invol vement
within his tory .

S artre ass e rts that

relatio ns betwee n me n are always the dial e ctical
conse que nce of their activity to pre cis ely the
extent that the y aris e as a transce ndence of
domination and ins titutional is ed human rel ations .
Man e xists for man onl y in give n circums tances
and s ocial conditions , s o eve ry human rel ati on
is his torical . (CRD 97-98 )
•

•

•

His tory is the unive rs al te mporal izati on.

His tory as a

whol e is the mul ti pl icity of i ndividual total izations by
indivi dual authors .

Thus , any particul ar author cannot

be the author of the entire total ization of h is tory .
His tory i s its elf proje ctive .

Ins ofar as the parti cul ar

total ization is an e ndl e s s movement toward th e unknown
future , h is tory is al s o a e ndl e s s proces s toward th e
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fu ture.

History, furthermore, is not merel y accu mulated

pas t incidents , but r ather a regressive- progressive synthesis.
Hist ory begins when the individual person begins t o
recognize his external worl d in the context of scarcity
and co-existence with other men.

History is the process in

which men endl essly try t o s ol ve their probl ems of
al ienation.

C HAPTER VI
CONC LUSI ON
Jea n-Paul Sa rtre in his Critique of D ialectical Reaso n
seeks to develop a theory o f history based o n humanistic
va lues.

The a im of this thesis is to describe and evaluate

that pro ject.
A s Sartre sa ys in the Sea rch for a Method , in his
introduction to his Critiq ue , his object o f study is individ
ual man.

He tries to explore the positio n of the individual

within a social-historical context because individual
consciousness and actions a re alwa ys attached to a given
society and histo ry.

For Sartre the individua l evolves his

o ntological freedom into practical, social f reedom only
in relation to o ther men within his economic and social
situation.
D ialectical reasoning is chosen to explain the inclusive
internal , and systematic mo vement of man's relatio nship with
his environment.

I n contrast to Hegel , Sartre asserts

that it is man , not Spirit , who unfolds the dialectica l
progression.

He also objects to Marx's no tio n that man is

merely a part o f the whole o f material na ture.

Sartre's

dialectica l ma terialism states tha t man , though his
intera ctio n with ma tter, comprehends and crea tes history.
Sartre attempts to apply existential onto lo gy to the
systematic interpretation of man's social beha vio r.
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His
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main contri buti on to social theory i s i n allocati ng
priori ty to an actor's consci ousness and acti ons.

Sartre

contends that contemporary emp i ri cal methods of social
inqui ry generate only si mpli sti c causal relati onships.
D ialectical reasoni ng , on the other hand , i s necessary to
vali dly depict human reali ty .
Sartre provides the basis for a humani stic i nterpreta
tion of social activi ty by clari fying what man is i n his
soci al- histori cal context.

His basi c and important

principle i s that everything begins with man's free p raxis,
everything man faces in the external world is faced with a
free choi ce.
His explanati on , a t times, i s i nadequate.

Sartre's

huma ni sti c di alecti cal materialism i s premised on s everal
p roblematic assumpti ons.
1.

The P ractico- inert.

Sartre argu es that the

materi al world i s a product of man , the results of man's
past p raxis.

However , since the practice- i nert i s beyond

the control of the p roducers , man seems to be p owerless to
control even his own praxi s.

Why is i t necessary to

produce what man never i ntends?

By ani mati ng the material

world as the p roduct of human p raxis Sartre tries to escape
the fact that man apparently lies totally within his
material envi ronment and is often unable to avoid its
determining i nfluence.
2.

Scarcity.

In the context of scarci ty men are

inevitably i n conflict.

Sartre assumes that men are so
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egoistic and s o hos til e that they are totally al i enated from
each other and , ul timatel y , from thems elves.

Is there any

poss ibil ity that the members of a s ociety coul d cooperate
to s hare s carce things with each other?

Jus t as Marxis t

anal ys is can be applicable only to certain s ocieties ,
Sartre ' s theory of s carcity is appl icabl e to s ome , but
not neces s aril y all , s ocieties which experience s carcity .
It is apparently val id only in s ocieties of hos til e ,
s el f- centered actors .
J.

V iolence.

T he reciprocity of individu als is

expl ained as freedom agains t freedom.

It is formed by the

effort to destroy an adversary ' s freedom to gain mine.
Sartre again assumes that man is s el f- centered.

Foll owing

the emergence of a grou p- in-fu s ion , man is l imited by his
promis e t o remain l oyal to group action.

T he viol ence u s ed

to maintain his promis e is that of freedom agains t freedom ,
which is revealed as the fraternity- terror.

T here is no

more freedom of individual will unless he is thoroughl y
is ol ated from s ociety.
really be free.

I n this s ituation, man can never

T he sys tem denies individual freedom in

order to maintain its exis tence.
4.

Third.

Men ' s reciprocity can be objectivel y

obs erved onl y by another man a s a third party , not by
concerned parties .

O nl y throu gh this third , who s ees the

other two actors as the objects of his perception , can
both actors have an objectified rol e in an his torical
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context.

This is als o the nature of huma n relationships

within a s ocial context.

Thus , even though Sartre ins is ts

that man is tota lly free, he b elieves that man is unab le
to recognize his role in history unaided.
In s um, Sartre's s hortcoming is that, even in the
context of s ocial and his torical relationships , he pers ists
in a s serting that everything is decided by man's free
intentionality .

R eal s ocial life, however, s hows the

exis tence of unavoidable restrictions .

Nian is inevitably

influenced by his exis ting s ocial context in deciding his
actions .

Though man is, as Sartre says , ontologically free,

and his freedom may never be thwarted under any circums tance,
he, nevertheless , inevitably encounters external limitations.
From his b irth, man faces es tablished s ocial conditions
which limit his a ctions .

Is it necessary that ma n's

product b ecomes anti- praxis ?

If s o, then we are not really

free, for if man freely chose his environment he would
likely not choos e that which harms him.
Sartre s tres s es the neces s ity of certain conditions
for dialectical development, b ut he tends to exces sively
s implify them.

For his dialectic to apply to a s ociety

its participants mus t encounter s carcity in the same way,
and feel hos tility and alienation.

But if man mus t lie in

thes e conditions to satisfy the dialectic, he is already
not free.

Freedom cannot b e explained in terms of compul

s ion or coercion.
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T he ge ne ral fallacy of S artre's theory is that he
simplifies social phenomena and perhaps trivializes the
imme nse social influe nce on an individual's be havior.
I nde e d , it cou ld be argu e d that in modern indu strial
societies , man ' s alienation from himse lf is e ve n greater
b e cause e nvironme ntal pressu re s are more intense and
u navoidab le .

C hoosing a life style , an occu pation, a grou p

activity , or any othe r individu al proj e ct is strongly
e ffected b y one's social stru ctu re.

S artre inadvertly

show s u s that a great deal of the material world is beyond
ou r control and co ntrary to our desires.
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